I'm skeptical of the state capacity as the primary driver of economic development.
First, let's consider the digital revolution of the 2010s. If state capacity were truly the primary driver of economic development, we should have seen significant economic gains from digitalization's enhancement of state capabilities. Digital technologies …
I'm skeptical of the state capacity as the primary driver of economic development.
First, let's consider the digital revolution of the 2010s. If state capacity were truly the primary driver of economic development, we should have seen significant economic gains from digitalization's enhancement of state capabilities. Digital technologies have dramatically reduced the costs of tax compliance and enabled developing nations to better tax their informal sectors. Surveillance and monitoring have become remarkably cheaper and more effective – from digital cameras to satellite imaging. We see practical applications of this technology already: Brazil uses satellite data to fight deforestation, while environmental groups leverage similar technology to expose methane leaks in gas infrastructure.
Yet the evidence doesn't support the expected outcome. Take India, for example. Despite enthusiastically embracing digital technology in both public and private sectors, India's growth in the 2010s was notably slower compared to the liberalization-driven growth of the 1990s and 2000s. The digital dividend for state capacity hasn't translated into accelerated economic development.
Perhaps most damning to the state capacity argument is the historical puzzle of East Asia. If state capacity were truly fundamental to economic development, how do we explain East Asia falling behind Europe in the first place? For centuries, East Asian states were far more sophisticated in their administrative capabilities than their European counterparts. The gap between Asia and Europe actually grew for hundreds of years, only beginning to close in the latter part of the 20th century.
These observations suggest that while state capacity might play a role in economic development, its importance may be overstated. The relationship between state power, technological capability, and economic growth appears to be more complex than the state capacity theory suggests.
I'm skeptical of the state capacity as the primary driver of economic development.
First, let's consider the digital revolution of the 2010s. If state capacity were truly the primary driver of economic development, we should have seen significant economic gains from digitalization's enhancement of state capabilities. Digital technologies have dramatically reduced the costs of tax compliance and enabled developing nations to better tax their informal sectors. Surveillance and monitoring have become remarkably cheaper and more effective – from digital cameras to satellite imaging. We see practical applications of this technology already: Brazil uses satellite data to fight deforestation, while environmental groups leverage similar technology to expose methane leaks in gas infrastructure.
Yet the evidence doesn't support the expected outcome. Take India, for example. Despite enthusiastically embracing digital technology in both public and private sectors, India's growth in the 2010s was notably slower compared to the liberalization-driven growth of the 1990s and 2000s. The digital dividend for state capacity hasn't translated into accelerated economic development.
Perhaps most damning to the state capacity argument is the historical puzzle of East Asia. If state capacity were truly fundamental to economic development, how do we explain East Asia falling behind Europe in the first place? For centuries, East Asian states were far more sophisticated in their administrative capabilities than their European counterparts. The gap between Asia and Europe actually grew for hundreds of years, only beginning to close in the latter part of the 20th century.
These observations suggest that while state capacity might play a role in economic development, its importance may be overstated. The relationship between state power, technological capability, and economic growth appears to be more complex than the state capacity theory suggests.